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1 Introduction
With the advance of globalization process, it is more convenient and profitable for multinational
companies (MNCs) to access foreign markets through foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI has
been the subject of considerable research in the past decades. There are several FDI incentives:
low corporate tax rates, cost reduction, financial subsidies provided by the foreign government,
etc. Among these, international tax rate differentials are big concerns for MNCs. Hines (1999)
and Grubert and Mutti (2000) document that the international differentials in corporate taxation
significantly influence the location of FDI. Table 1 shows corporate tax rates in different countries
in 2008.1
Table 1: Corporate tax rates in different countries (2008).
Source: KPMG’s corporate tax rate survey 2008
To increase after-tax profits, MNCs have an incentive to shift profits from low- to high-tax
countries. Since debt payments are deductible (tax benefits of debt), it is well known that
international tax rate differentials create opportunities for debt shifting from high- to low-tax
countries.2 On the basis of a large sample of European firms over the 1994-2003 period, Huizinga
et al. (2008) demonstrate that a foreign subsidiary’s capital structure at its establishment is
positively related to domestic corporate tax rate as well as the difference between the domestic
and foreign tax rates. Moreover, they report that ignoring the international debt shifting arising
from tax rate differentials would understate the impact of tax rate on debt policy by about 25%.
The objective of this paper is to develop a theoretic model to examine the impact of debt
shifting on financing and investment decisions of foreign subsidiary, taking into consideration
the foregn exchange (FX) rate uncertainty. Suppose a parent firm, which is located in domestic
lDharmapala and Hines (2009) find that small and better-governed countries are more likely to become tax
heavens.
2See Hines (1999), Mills and Newberry (2004), and Mintz and Smart (2004).
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country with high tax rate, considers establishment of a subsidiary in foreign country with low
tax rate. By investigating both the financing and investment decisions of the foreign subsidiary,
we find that debt shifting induces earlier investment and default of foreign subsidiary, larger
coupon level of debt, and higher leverage and credit spread. We demonstrate that when the
difference between the domestic and foreign tax rates is large, the optimal leverage of foreign
subsidiary at its establishment increases, and the inefficiency of investment due to ignoring debt
shifting also increases. This is consistent with the empirical results in Huizinga et al. (2008).
Moreover, we find that the investment of foreign subsidiary advances as FX rate uncertainty
rises and becomes more correlated with the uncertainty in foreign market, which echoes the
results in Goldberg and Kolstad (1995). The inefficiency of investment due to ignoring debt
shifting decreases with the uncertainty of FX rate.
It is worth noting that so far the theoretical literature on FDI has mainly focused on either
capital structure decision (see Panteghini (2009)) or investment decision (see Yu et al. (2007)),
without considering the FX rate uncertainty. That is, uncertainty is modeled by a single process
in the models above.
The main contribution of this paper is to enrich the analysis by introducing the FX rate
uncertainty and examining the interaction of financing and investment decisions of foreign sub-
sidiary. By doing so, we provide a theoretical framework that allows us to better interpret the
empirical findings of FDI that incorporate FX rate and tax rate factors. Technically, this paper
applies the first-hitting-time approach via change of measure to consider the two-dimensional
problem. If we ignore FX rate dynamics, the discount rate differentials, and tax rate differentials,
our model is reduced to the one-dimensional problem analyzed in Sundaresan and Wang (2007),
which use a real options approach to examine financing and investment and capital structure
decisions of a domestic firm.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setup of the
model. Section 3 examines the financing and investment decisions of the foreign subsidiary,
employing the first-hitting-time approach via change of measure. Section 4 calibrates the model
to analyze the characteristics of the solutions and provide several model predictions. Section 5
concludes.
2 Model setup
Suppose a parent firm, which is located in country $d$ (domestic country), considers establishment
of a subsidiary in country $f$ (foreign country) at a fixed cost $I$ in foreign currency. The parent
firm and the foreign subsidiary together form a MNC, which is assumed to be risk neutral. The
MNC can finance the irreversible investment cost $I$ in foreign currency by issuing both equity and
a perpetual debt with continuous coupon payment $c$ . After establishing the foreign subsidiary
at time $T^{i}$ , the MNC instantaneously receives EBIT $X(t)$ in foreign currency, and pays coupon
$c$ in foreign currency to debtholders. We assume that both the EBIT $X(t)$ in foreign market and
the FX rate $Q(t)$ (the domestic currency price of one unit of foreign currency) follow geometric
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Brownian motions (GBMs) under probablity measure $\mathbb{Q}$ :
$\frac{dX(t)}{X(t)}=\mu_{x}dt+\sigma_{x}dw_{1}(t)$ , $X(0)=x_{0}>0$ ,
(2.1)
$\frac{dQ(t)}{Q(t)}=(r_{d}-r_{f})dt+\sigma_{q}(\rho dw_{1}(t)+\sqrt{1-\rho^{2}}dw_{2}(t))$ , $Q(O)=q_{0}>0$ ,
where $r_{d}$ and $r_{f}$ are the risk-free interest rates in countries $d$ and $f$ , respectively, and $(w_{1}(t), w_{2}(t))$
is a two-dimensional standard Brownian motion under probablity measure $\mathbb{Q}$ . That is, EBIT
$X(t)$ is correlated to FX rate $Q(t)$ with a constant correlation coefficient $\rho$ . This assumption
reflects the well-known empirical evidence that there exists correlation between FX rate dy-
namics and equity market development. The initial value $X(O)=x_{0}$ is sufficiently low; i.e.,
EBIT in foreign market has not yet been favorable enough to cover the irreversible cost and the
uncertainty.
For model simplicity, we follow Panteghini (2009) to assume that the parent firm produces a
deterministic profit in domestic country with no default risk. A plausible explanation for the risk
asymmetry in domestic and foreign countries is given by the fact that operating in the domestic
country may be less risky than operating abroad. This is realistic since parent firms are aware
of the characteristics of their own country, and thus can more easily predict and offset changes
on their domestic business environment. Moreover, by assuming that the profit in domestic
country is deterministic, the uncertainties are reduced from three dimensions to two dimensions
(i.e., the foreign market uncertainty and the FX rate uncertainty). Then, the stopping times
depend only on $X(t)(=X(t)Q(t)/Q(t))$ (see Eq(2.6)). We emphasize that the main results and
insights of this paper on financing and investment decisions of foreign subsidiary could hardly
be obtained without the assumption above.3
Let $\tau_{d}$ and $\tau_{f}$ denote the corporate tax rates in countries $d$ and $f$ , respectively, with $\tau_{d}>\tau_{f}$ .
Without debt shifting, the MNC’s instantaneous profit from foreign subsidiary (in domestic
currency) at time $t$ is
$(1-\tau_{f})(X(t)-c)Q(t)$ . (2.2)
Both the effective tax rate for EBIT in foreign market and the effective deductible tax-rate for
coupon is $\tau_{f}$ .
However, if debt shifting is possible, the MNC can extract more tax benefits with debt
shifting since coupon payments are tax deductible. Concretely, the MNC has an incentive to
issue debt not locally in foreign country with low tax rate, but to issue debt in domestic country
with high tax rate and shift debt to foreign subsidiary. Mills and Newberry (2004) report that
although debt shifting may bring tax benefits, it is also associated with transaction costs. We
assume that MNC shifts a precentage $k$ of the foreign subsidiary’s coupon $c$ with a quadratic
cost function $\iota/(k)=\frac{n}{2}k^{2},$ $k\in[0,1]$ , where $n\geq 0$ measures how costly for debt shifting. It can
be easily checked that $\nu’(k)\geq 0,$ $\iota/’’(k)\geq 0,$ $\iota/(0)=0$ . Then, with debt shifting, the MNC’s
3Hu and $\emptyset ksendal$ (1998) analyze the investment decision in an all-equity financing framework (i.e., without
financing decision) and suggest the shape of the stopping region is linear when the parameters satisfy certain
conditions in general n-dimensions.
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Note that while the effective tax rate for EBIT in foreign market is $\tau_{f}$ , the effective deductible
tax-rate for coupon is $\tilde{\tau}$ .
The optimal percentage $k^{*}$ of coupon shifting can be obtained in the following:
$k^{*}=argmk$ax $\phi(k)=\{\begin{array}{ll}1, 0\leq n\leq\overline{n},\frac{\overline{n}}{n}, n\geq\overline{n},\end{array}$ (2.5)
where
$\overline{n}=\frac{\tau_{d}-\tau_{f}}{1-\tau_{d}}$ .
That is, the optimal percentage $k^{*}$ increases with the difference between the domestic and foreign
tax rates. Substituting Eq.(2.5) into Eq.(2.4), we obtain $\tilde{\tau}$ as:
$\overline{\tau}=\{\begin{array}{l}\tau_{d}-\frac{1}{2}(1-\tau_{d})n\in[\frac{1}{2}(\tau_{d}+\tau_{f}), \tau_{d}], 0\leq n\leq\overline{n},\tau_{f}+\frac{(\tau_{d}-\tau_{f})^{2}}{2(1-T_{d)n}} \in[\tau_{f}, \frac{1}{2}(\tau_{d}+\tau_{f})], n\geq\overline{n}.\end{array}$
Note that $\tilde{\tau}>\tau_{f}$ , which implies that the effective deductible-tax rate is larger with debt shifting.
Although issuing debt can obtain tax benefits, it is also accompanied with default costs. As
in Leland (1994), we consider a stock-based definition of default whereby equityholders inject
funds in the subsidiary as long as equity value of the subsidiary is positive. In other words,
equityholders default on their debt obligations the first time equity value of the subsidiary is
equal to zero. We assume that the debt of the subsidiary is not guaranteed legally by the parent
firm, because they are separate entities. Let $T^{b}$ denote the time the foreign subsidiary goes
into default, which is determined by the MNC. At the default threshold, $\alpha\in(0,1)$ part of the
subsidiary’s firm value is lost as default cost, the remaining $(1-\alpha)$ part belongs to debtholders
of the subsidiary. The parent firm exists as a domestic firm after that.
Notice that the MNC’s instantaneous profit in relation to foreign subsidiary, which is de-
scribed in Eq.(2.3), is first-order homogeneous in $(X(t)Q(t), Q(t))$ . According to McDonald and
Siegel (1986), we define the stopping times $T^{i}$ and $T^{b}$ as follows:
$T^{i}= \inf\{t\geq 0,$ $\frac{X(t)Q(t)}{Q(t)}$ $x^{i} \}=\inf\{t\geq 0, X(t)\geq x^{i}\}$ ,
(2.6)
$T^{b}= \inf\{t\geq T^{i},$ $\frac{X(t)Q(t)}{Q(t)}\leq x^{b}\}=\inf\{t\geq T^{i}, X(t)\leq x^{b}\}$.
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3 Financing and Investment decisions of foreign subsidiary
Through this paer, we assume that equityholders make the decisions. In our model, there are
two types of interrelated decisions in relation to foreign subsidiary: financing and investment
decisions. The investment decision is characterized by an endogenously determined threshold;
when the EBIT process of the foreign country $(X(t))_{t>0}$ reaches investment threshold $x^{i}$ , MNC
establishes the foreign subsidiary. The financing decision involves the choice of debt level and
an endogenous default threshold of the foreign subsidiary. The coupon level of debt $c(x^{i})$ , which
is characterized by a trade-off between the tax benefits and default costs of debt financing, is
determined simultaneously with the investment decision of the foreign subsidiary. In contrast,
the default threshold $x^{b}(c)$ , which depends on coupon level, is determined after the foreign
subsidiary is established. Note that the three endogenous variables in our model (i.e., $x^{i},$ $c(x^{i})$ ,
and $x^{b}(c))$ form a nested structure, and therefore enables us to examine the interaction between
financing and investment decisions.
We derive the MNC’s decisions using backward induction. Section 3.1 examines the default
threshold of foreign subsidiary from the values after investment of foreign subsidiary. Section 3.2
analyzes the the coupon level of debt and optimal investment policy of the foreign subsidiary.
3.1 Default decision
To determine the bankrputcy threshold, we need first derive the values after investment of foreign
subsidiary. According to our setup, for $T^{i}\leq t\leq T^{b}$ , the equity value and debt value of foreign
subsidiary (in domestic currency) are evaluated as
$E(x, q)= E[\int^{T^{b}}e^{-r_{d}(s-t)}[(1-\tau_{f})X(s)Q(s)-(1-\tilde{\tau})cQ(s)]ds|(X(t), Q(t))=(x, q)]$ ,
$D(x, q)= E[\int_{t}^{T^{b}}e^{-r_{d}(s-t)}cQ(s)ds|(X(t), Q(t))=(x, q)]$ (3.1)
$+ E[e^{-r_{d}(T^{b}-t)}(1-\alpha)\frac{(1-\tau_{f})X(T^{b})Q(T^{b})}{r_{f}-\mu_{x}-\rho\sigma_{q}\sigma_{x}}|(X(t), Q(t))=(x, q)]$ ,
respectively, where $E[\cdot|(X(t), Q(t))=(x, q)]$ denotes the expectation operator under probability
measure $\mathbb{Q}$ , given that $(X(t), Q(t))=(x, q)$ . We assume $r_{f}>\mu_{x}+\rho\sigma_{q}\sigma_{x}$ for convergency, where
the term $\rho\sigma_{q}\sigma_{x}$ exists because of the correlation between EBIT and FX rate. The firm value is
the sum of the equity value and debt value.
$V(x, q)= E[\int^{T^{b}}e^{-r_{d}(s-t)}[(1-\tau_{f})X(s)Q(s)+\tilde{\tau}cQ(s)]ds|(X(t), Q(t))=(x, q)]$
(3.2)
$+ E[e^{-r_{d}(T^{b}-t)}(1-\alpha)\frac{(1-\tau_{f})X(T^{b})Q(T^{b})}{r_{f}-\mu_{x}-\rho\sigma_{q}\sigma_{x}}|(X(t), Q(t))=(x, q)]$ .
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For convenience, we consider the following process:
$d\ln X(t)=(\mu_{x}-\frac{\sigma_{x}^{2}}{2})dt+\sigma_{x}dw_{1}(t)$ ,
$d\ln Q(t)=(r_{d}-r_{f}-\frac{\sigma_{q}^{2}}{2})dt+\sigma_{q}(\rho dw_{1}(t)+\sqrt{1-\rho^{2}}dw_{2}(t))$ , (3.3)
$d\ln(XQ)(t)=(\mu_{x}+r_{d}-r_{f}-\frac{\sigma_{x}^{2}+\sigma_{q}^{2}}{2})dt+(\sigma_{x}+\rho\sigma_{q})dw_{1}(t)+\sqrt{1-\rho^{2}}\sigma_{q}dw_{2}(t)$.
Then, the stopping times defined in Eq.(2.6) can be rewritten as
$T^{i}= \inf\{t\geq 0, \ln X(t)\geq\ln x^{i}\}$ , $T^{b}= \inf\{t\geq T^{i}, \ln X(t)\leq\ln x^{b}\}$ . (3.4)
The equity value and debt value in Eq.(3.1) can also be written as
$E(x, q)= E[\int_{t}^{T^{b}}e^{-r_{d}(s-t)}[(1-\tau_{f})e^{\ln(XQ)(s)}-(1-\tilde{\tau})ce^{\ln Q(s)}]ds|(X(t), Q(t))=(x, q)]$ ,
$D(x, q)= E[\int^{T^{b}}e^{-r_{d}(s-t)}ce^{\ln Q(s)}ds|(X(t), Q(t))=(x, q)]$
$+ E[e^{-r_{d}(T^{b}-t)}(1-\alpha)\frac{(1-\tau_{f})e^{\ln(XQ)(T^{b})}}{r_{f}-\mu_{x}-\rho\sigma_{q}\sigma_{x}}|(X(t), Q(t))=(x, q)]$ ,
(3.5)
Now, define a new probability measure $\mathbb{P}$ by
$\frac{d\mathbb{P}}{d\mathbb{Q}}=\eta(t)=e^{-v_{z}w_{1}(t)-\frac{1}{2}v_{z}^{2}t}\mathcal{F}_{t}$ ’
where $v_{z}=(\mu_{x}-\sigma_{x}^{2}/2)/\sigma_{x}$ . Then $(W_{1}, W_{2})$ forms a two-dimensional standard Brownian motion.4
$dW_{1}(t)$ $=$ $dw_{1}(t)+v_{z}dt$ ,
$dW_{2}(t)$ $=$ $dw_{2}(t)$ .
Under the new probability mesure $\mathbb{P}$ ,
dln $X(t)$ $=$ $\sigma_{x}dW_{1}(t)$ ,
dln $Q(t)$ $=$ $(r_{d}-r_{f}- \frac{\sigma_{q}^{2}}{2}-\rho\sigma_{q}v_{z})dt+\sigma_{q}(\rho dW_{1}(t)+\sqrt{1-\rho^{2}}dW_{2}(t))$ ,
$d\ln(XQ)(t)$ $=$ $(r_{d}-r_{f}- \frac{\sigma_{q}^{2}}{2}-\rho\sigma_{q}v_{z})dt+(\rho\sigma_{q}+\sigma_{x})dW_{1}(t)+\sqrt{1-\rho^{2}}\sigma_{q}dW_{2}(t)$ .
The stopping times can be rewritten as
$T^{i}= \inf\{t\geq 0,$ $W_{1}(t)=i\}$ , $i= \frac{\ln x^{i}-\ln x}{\sigma_{x}}$ ,
$($ 3.6 $)$
$T^{b}= \inf\{t\geq T^{i},$ $W_{1}(t)=b\}$ , $b= \frac{\ln x^{b}-\ln x}{\sigma_{x}}$ .
$\overline{4We}$use the change-of-measure technique here as in Kijima et al. (2010).
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By using the Laplace transform of first hitting time, we obtain the following proposition.
The proof can be given upon request.
Proposition 3.1 (Values after investment of foreign subsidiary)
For $T^{i}\leq t\leq T_{f}^{b}$
(i) equity value:
$E(x, q)= \frac{1-\tau_{f}}{r_{f}-\mu_{x}-\rho\sigma_{q}\sigma_{x}}[xq-x^{b}q(\frac{x}{x^{b}})^{\beta_{1}}]-\frac{1-\tilde{\tau}}{r_{f}}cq[1-(\frac{x}{x^{b}})^{\beta_{2}}]$ . (3.7)
(ii) debt value:
$D(x, q)= \frac{cq}{r_{f}}[1-(\frac{x}{x^{b}})^{\beta_{2}}]+(1-\alpha)\frac{1-\tau_{f}}{r-\mu_{x}-\rho\sigma_{q}\sigma_{x}}x^{b}q(\frac{x}{x^{b}})^{\beta_{1}}$ . (3.8)
(iii) firm value:






The equity value of foreign subsidiary after investment (in domesitc currency) has two com-
ponents: (i) the present value of EBIT without default; (ii) the present value of the coupon
payments paid to the debtholders without default. Note that the coefficients of default option
$\beta_{1}\neq\beta_{2}$ generally, because the first hitting time of the processes $X(t)Q(t)$ and $Q(t)$ differs. The
debt value of foreign subsidiary after investment (in domestic currency) also has two compo-
nents: (i) the present value of coupon payments without default; (ii) the remaining firm value
upon default. The firm value $V(x, q)$ is the sum of equity value and debt value.
The optimal default threshold of foreign subsidiary is determined to maximize the $ex$ post
equity value after debt has been issued, as in Leland (1994).
$\frac{dE(x,q)}{dx}|_{x=x^{b}}=0$ .
Solving the equation above, we get
$x^{b}=Ac$ , (310)
where
$A= \frac{\beta_{2}}{\beta_{1}-1}\frac{1-\tilde{\tau}}{1-\tau_{f}}\frac{r_{f}-\mu_{x}-\rho\sigma_{q}\sigma_{x}}{r_{f}}$ . (3.11)
Note that the default threshold $x^{b}$ is a linear function of the coupon level $c$ .
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3.2 Coupon level and investment decisions
Before turning to the analysis of coupon level and investment decisions, it is important to make
a clear distinction between the $ex$ ante equity value and the $ex$ post equity value. While the
$ex$ post equity value is given by the present value of the cash flow accruing to equityholders
after debt has been issued (see Eq(3.7)), the $ex$ ante equity value is given by the sum of the $ex$
post equity value and debt value (see Eq(3.9)) at the time it is issued. As a result, although
equityholders choose the default threshold to maximize the $ex$ post equity value, they choose
the coupon level and investment threshold to maximize the firm value ( $ex$ ante equity value),
intemalizing both the tax benefits and default costs of debt financing. That is,
$c^{*}(x^{i})=argmc$ax $V(x^{i}, Q(T^{i}))$ , (3.12)
Substituting $x^{b}=Ac$ into Eq.(3.9) with $(x, q)=(x^{i}, Q(T^{i}))$ , the firm value upon investment
can be expressed as:
$V(x^{i}, Q(T^{i}))= \frac{(1-\tau_{f})x^{i}Q(T^{i})}{r_{f}-\mu_{x}-\rho\sigma_{q}\sigma_{x}}+\frac{\tilde{\tau}}{r_{f}}\frac{x^{i}}{A}\frac{Ac}{x^{i}}Q(T^{i})[1-(\frac{Ac}{x^{i}})^{-\beta_{2}}-\alpha\frac{\beta_{2}}{\beta_{1}-1}\frac{1-\tilde{\tau}}{\tilde{\tau}}(\frac{Ac}{x^{i}})^{-\beta_{1}}]$ .
(3.13)
Therefore,





Substituting $Ac/x^{i}=m$ into Eq.(3.13), the firm value upon investment can be rewritten as
$V(x^{i}, Q(T^{i}))=B \frac{1-\tau f}{r_{f}-\mu_{x}-\rho\sigma_{q}\sigma_{x}}x^{\dot{\iota}}Q(T^{i})$ ,
where
$B(m)=1- \alpha m^{1-\beta_{1}}+\frac{\tilde{\tau}}{1-\tilde{\tau}}\frac{\beta_{1}-1}{\beta_{2}}m(1-m^{-\beta_{2}})$.
Having derived the firm value, we next analyze the optimal investment threshold. Since the
investment cost financed by equity is $IQ(T^{i})-D(x^{i},$ $Q(T^{i})$ , the equityholders choose the optimal
investment threshold of foreign subsidiary as follows:
$x^{i*}=argmx^{i}$ax $E[e^{-r_{d}T^{i}}[E(x^{i}, Q(T^{i}))-(IQ(T^{i})-D(x^{i}, Q(T^{i})))]$ $(X$ (0) $, Q(0))=(x_{0}, q_{0})]$
(3.15)
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Note that the objective function of the maximization problem (3.15) is exactly the $ex$ ante firm
value of foreign subsidiary:
$V^{o}(x_{0}, q0;x^{i})=E[e^{-r_{d}T^{\iota}}[V(x^{i}, Q(T"))$ $-IQ(T”)]$ $|(X(0), Q(O))=(x_{0}, q_{0})]$
$=(B \frac{1-\tau_{f}}{r_{f}-\mu_{x}-\rho\sigma_{q}\sigma_{x}}x^{i}-I)E_{0}[e^{-r_{d}T^{i}}Q(T^{i})]$ .
(3.16)
Therefore, we choose the optimal investment threshold $x^{i*}$ to maximize the $ex$ ante firm value.
Solving the maximization problem, and substituting $x^{i*}$ into Eq(3.14) and then Eq.(3.10), we
finally obtain Proposition 3.2.
Proposition 3.2 (Optimal threshold and coupon level of foreign subsidiary)
The optimal investment threshold of foreign subsidiary is given by
$x^{i*}= \frac{r_{f}-\mu_{x}-\rho\sigma_{q}\sigma_{x}}{1-\tau_{f}}\frac{\beta_{3}}{\beta_{3}-1}\frac{1}{B(m^{*})}I$ , (3.17)
where
$\beta_{3}=-\frac{v_{z}+\rho\sigma_{q}-\sqrt{K+2r_{d}}}{\sigma_{x}}>1$ ,
$B(\cdot)$ is defined by Eq.(3.15), and $m^{*}$ satisfies
$1-(1- \beta_{2})(m^{*})^{-\beta_{2}}+\alpha\beta_{2}\frac{1-\overline{\tau}}{\tilde{\tau}}(m^{*})^{-\beta_{1}}=0$. (3.18)
The default threshold of foreign subsidiary is obtained as
$x^{b*}=m^{*}x^{i*}= \frac{r_{f}-\mu_{x}-\rho\sigma_{q}\sigma_{x}}{1-\tau_{j}}\frac{\beta_{3}}{\beta_{3}-1}\frac{m^{*}}{B(m^{*})}I$. (3.19)
The coupon level of foreign subsidiary is given by
$c^{*}= \frac{x^{i*}}{A}m^{*}=\frac{\beta_{3}}{\beta_{3}-1}\frac{\beta_{2}}{\beta_{1}-1}\frac{r_{f}}{1-\tilde{\tau}}\frac{m^{*}}{B(m^{*})}I$ . (3.20)
The leverage and credit spread of foreign subsidiary upon investment are
$CS^{*}(x^{i*},Q(T^{i*}))= \frac- r_{d}- m^{-\beta_{2}}+(1-\alpha)(1-\overline{\tau})\frac{\beta_{2}}{\beta_{1}- 1}m^{-\text{ }}]^{-1}r_{f}-.r_{d}L^{*}(x^{i*},Q(T^{i*}))=\frac{D(x^{i*},Q(T^{i*}))}{D(x^{i*},Q(T^{i*}))V(x^{i*},Q(T^{i*}))c^{*}Q(T^{i*})}=[\frac{\beta_{1}- 1}{=[1\beta_{2}}\frac{m^{*}}{1-\tilde{\tau}}(1-(m^{*})^{-\beta_{2}})+(1-\alpha)(m^{*})^{\beta_{1]\frac{1}{B(m^{*})}}}(321’)$
The investment threshold, the coupon level, and the default threshold are all proportional to the
investment cost $I$ , due to the GBM assuption for the EBIT and FX rate processes Eq.(2.1). The
ratio of default threshold to investment threshold is $m^{*}$ , which is constant and determined by
Eq.(3.18). Both the leverage and credit spread upon investment are constant and independent
of investment cost $I$ .
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3.3 Special case
If ignoring the FX rate and the interest rate diffrentials $(i.e., \sigma_{q}=0, \rho=1, q_{0}=1, r_{f}=r_{d})$ ,
then simple calculations give that






Therefore, we obtain the following analytical results.
Lemma 3.1 (Special case)
If ignoring the $FX$ rate and the interest rate diffrentials, the optimal investment threshold of
foreign subsidiary is
$x^{i**}=-$$\beta-11-\tau_{f}\beta r_{f}-\mu_{x}\frac{1}{g(\tilde{\tau})}I$ .
The default threshold of foreign subsidiary is obtained as
$x^{b**}=h( \overline{\tau})x^{i**}=\frac{\beta}{\beta-1}\frac{r_{f}-\mu_{x}}{1-\tau_{f}}\frac{h(\tilde{\tau})}{g(\tilde{\tau})}I$.
The coupon level of foreign subsidiary is given by
$c^{**}(x^{i**})= \frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}\frac{1-\tau_{f}r_{f}}{1-\tilde{\tau}r_{f}-\mu_{x}}h(\tilde{\tau})x^{i**}=\frac{\beta}{\beta-1}\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}\frac{r_{f}}{1-\tilde{\tau}}\frac{g(\tilde{\tau})}{h(\tilde{\tau})}I$.





Moreover, if there is no debt shifting $(i.e., \tilde{\tau}=\tau_{f})$ , the results above are reduced to those derived
in Sundaresan and Wang (2007a).
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4 Model implications
In this section, we calibrate the model to analyze the characteristics of the solutions and provide
several model predictions. The basic parameter values are set as follows: $\mu_{x}=0.01,$ $\sigma_{x}=$
$0.35,$ $\sigma_{q}=0.1,$ $\rho=0.5,$ $r_{d}=0.04,$ $r_{f}=0.06,$ $\tau_{d}=0.4,$ $\tau_{f}=0.15,$ $\alpha=0.4,$ $n=0,$ $I=10,$ $x=$
$1,$ $q=12$ .
4.1 Inefficiency
Figure 1 plots the $ex$ ante firm value and investment threshold of foreign subsidiary, where $N$”
and $S$ ” denote no debt shifting and debt shifting, respectively. We find that the $ex$ ante firm
value of foreign subsidiary is larger and the investment of foreign subsidiary occurs earlier with
debt shifting. Next, we consider the inefficiency due to ignoring debt shifting. The inefficiency
Figure 1: $Ex$ ante firm value and investment threshold of foreign subsidiary.
in $ex$ ante firm value and leverage are defined as follows:
$\Delta V^{o*}(x_{0}, q_{0};x^{i*})=1-\frac{V_{N}^{o*}(x_{0},q_{0};x_{N}^{i*})}{V_{S}^{o*}(x_{0},q_{0};x_{S}^{i*})}$, $\Delta L^{*}(x^{i*}, Q(T^{i*}))=1-\frac{L^{*}(x_{N}^{i*},Q(T_{N}^{i*}))}{L^{*}(x_{S}^{i*},Q(T_{S}^{i*}))}$ . (4.1)
Figure 2 indicates that inefficiency of investment increases when tax rate differentials increase
and FX rate uncertainty decreases. For our basic parameter values $(\triangle\tau=0.25, \sigma_{q}=0.1)$ ,
the ineffiecinecy in $ex$ ante firm value is about 20%, and the ineffiecinecy in leverage is over
40%. Therefore, the impact of debt shifting cannot be ignored. This result echoes the empirical
evidence in Huizinga et al. (2008), who report that ignoring debt shifting would understate the
impact of tax rate on debt policy by about 25%.
4.2 Comparative statics of thresholds
Figure 3 demonstrates that the investment threshold decreases when (i) tax rate differentials
increase (top left panel), (ii) debt shifting cost decreases (top right panel), (iii) the trend of
FX rate rises (middle left panel), (iv) the uncertainty of FX rate rises (middle right panel),
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Figure 2: Inefficiency with tax rate differentials and FX rate uncertainty.
(v) the correlation between FX rate and foreign market increases (bottom panel).5 The former
three results are intuitvely right. For example, if the domestic currency is Janpanese yen, the
third result implies that investment advances when the Janpanese yen is strong. The latter two
results are consistent with the empirical findings in Goldberg and Kolstad (1995), who point
that investment advances as FX rate uncertainty rises and becomes more correlated with the
uncertainty in foreign market. On the other hand, the default threshold increases with tax rate
differentials (top left panel) and debt shifting cost (top right panel). The reason is that, as tax
rate differentials increase and debt shifting cost decreases, the coupon level increases, and so
does the default threshold. The effect of other three parameters $(\triangle r,$ $\rho$ , and $\sigma_{q})$ on the default
threshold works in the same direction with that on the investment threshold.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we applied a a first-hitting-time approach via change of mesure to examine the
impact of intemational debt shifting on financing and investment decisions of foreign subsidiary,
incorporating FX rate uncertainty. We found that debt shifting induces earlier investment
and default of foreign subsidiary, larger coupon level of debt, and higher leverage and credit
spread. The quantitative effects of intemational debt shifting cannot be ignored. Our results
are consistent with several empirical findings. When tax rate differentials increase, the optimal
leverage of foreign subsidiary at its establishment increases, as Huizinga et al. (2008) report.
Also, investment of foreign subsidiary advances as FX rate uncertainty rises and becomes more
correlated with the uncertainty in foreign market, which echoes the results in Goldberg and
Kolstad (1995). Moreover, igonoring FX rate uncertianty and the possibility of debt shifting
reduces our model to Sundaresan and Wang (2007).
5We set $\rho=0.2$ in the bottom panel of Figure 3 and Figure 2 to ensure the condition $r_{f}>\mu_{X}+\rho\sigma_{q}\sigma_{X}$ is
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Figure 3: Thresholds of foreign subsidiary with different parameters.
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